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Aid and its Impact on the Donor’s Export Industry – The Dutch Case  
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper models the link between Dutch development aid and Dutch exports to 142 recipient countries over the 
period from 1964 to 2011. Given that Dutch aid policy drastically changed in 1999, the model is estimated 
separately for the 1964-1999 and the 2000-2011 periods. Dynamic gravity models applied to aggregate exports 
are estimated controlling for the reverse causality of aid. The findings indicate that there is a positive and 
significant long-run impact of Dutch bilateral aid on Dutch exports which is mainly driven by the effect in the 
first period of analysis. The return to aid ranges from $0.26 to $0.40 for each 1$ of aid disbursed, primarily in the 
1964-1999 period. The return to aid is not statistically significant in the   2000 to 2011 period, in which only 33 
countries with a bilateral development relationship with the Netherlands (15 countries after 2010) continued to 
receive substantial amounts of aid. 
Key Words: development aid, exports, Netherlands, GMM, gravity model 
JEL Classification: F10 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of Dutch development aid is to benefit developing countries; it is targeted not only 
towards relieving hunger, eliminating malnutrition, reducing poverty, and eradicating 
diseases, but also at building economic and social infrastructure to increase production and 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, for decision makers in the Dutch Parliament and Government, 
it is important that the Netherlands benefits from giving aid, or more specifically that, as a 
result of development aid, Dutch producers are able to increase their exports to aid recipient 
countries. 
Dutch development aid has undergone several important changes during recent decades. The 
most important of these changes are the reduction in the number of recipient countries, 
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currently focusing on only 15 countries, and the specialization in a reduced number of key 
areas, such as sexual and reproductive health and rights, and water and food security.  
The volume of aid has increased in the last four decades, making the Netherlands one of the 
few donor countries who have fulfilled (or even surpassed) the goal of 0.7% of the desired 
aid-to-gross national income (GNI) ratio. In 2010, however, the budget for development 
cooperation was reduced from 0.8% to 0.7% of GNI under the new minority coalition 
government formed by the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats, and general budget 
support was discontinued. The budget cuts also entailed the closure of several embassies 
responsible for channelling Dutch bilateral aid. Policy observers also saw a change in the 
focus of Dutch development aid from a purely development orientation to one representing a 
stronger stake for Dutch business in development projects.  
The objective of this study is twofold. First, to examine how Dutch bilateral 
development aid affects Dutch exporters at an aggregate level; second, to compute the return 
on Dutch bilateral aid. To this end, we perform an empirical study on how aid affects donors’ 
bilateral exports. The original contribution of this study stems not only from the focus on 
Dutch exports but also from the application of sophisticated econometric techniques that 
control for endogeneity, heterogeneity and autocorrelation. Using these techniques, we are 
able to obtain unbiased and consistent aid-export elasticities. 
The current study is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the reader to the 
related literature on the effect of aid on donors’ trade. Section 3 presents the theoretical 
underpinnings for the aid-export link and the augmented gravity model on which the 
estimations are based. Section 4 describes the data, sources and the concept of aid being used. 
In Section 5 we present the main results utilizing panel fixed effects and generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimation techniques. Finally, Section 6 puts our results into 
perspective. 
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2. Literature Review 
Of the studies that investigate the impact of aid on donors’ bilateral exports, Nilsson (1997) 
was the first author to focus on European donors. In particular, he analyzed the link between 
aid and exports for European Union donors to 108 recipients over the period 1975 to 1992. He 
estimated a static specification of the gravity model of trade and found an elasticity of exports 
with respect to aid of 0.23, which for the average donor, translates into an increase of US$2.6 
in exports for each dollar of aid given. In particular, the return on foreign aid for the 
Netherlands was a US$1.09 increase in Dutch exports for each dollar of aid given. Also using 
a gravity framework, Wagner (2003) investigated the effect of aid on trade for twenty donors 
to 109 recipient countries for the period 1970 to 1990. The estimated trade elasticities with 
respect to aid ranged from 0.062 for fixed-effects (FE) to 0.195 (for pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) specifications), respectively. These elasticities translate into average returns on 
donors’ aid of around US$2.29 (OLS) and US$0.73 (FE) of exports per dollar of aidi. The 
return for the Netherlands was a US$0.52 increase in Dutch exports for each dollar of aid 
given. More recently, Pettersson and Johansson (2013) found that aid increased bilateral trade 
flows for both donors and recipients. They found a positive link between aid and donors’ 
exports, and an even stronger relationship between aid in the form of technical assistance and 
exports in both directions. This supported their interpretation that market knowledge through 
interpersonal relations is an important driver of exports. However, these results were obtained 
without controlling for unobservable heterogeneity related to each bilateral relationship, and 
so this could bias the estimates, as pointed out in Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2013). Finally, 
Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2015a), also in a multi-country setting, found that, in general, 
donors’ bilateral aid has positively affected their exports to developing countries. These 
results point to sizeable beneficial effects of bilateral aid on donor’s exports and to non-
negligible effects of multilateral aid in the short term. 
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Moving to single country studies, the German case has been investigated in Nowak-
Lehmann D. et al. (2009) and Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009), with both papers finding that 
German exporters benefit from German bilateral aid. In particular, US$1.00 of German aid 
increases German exports by between US$1.00 and US$ 1.50 on average (this effect was 
based on a positive, significant impact of aid ranging between 0.08 and 0.13, meaning that a 
10% increase in aid translates into an 8-13% increase in exports). A very recent study by 
Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2016), which uses more modern techniques and more recent data, 
suggests that the impact of aid on German exports is still positive and significant but slightly 
lower than US$1.00. More specifically, one dollar of aid generates US$0.83 of exports 
according to the latest figures. However, it can be shown that the effect of aid varies with the 
economic sector analyzed, for instance machinery, electrical and transport equipment have 
statistically significant and above-average aid-export elasticities.  
The Danish case has also been recently investigated in Hansen and Rand (2014). The 
authors obtain an average return of aid in terms of exports that is lower than the figures 
obtained for Germany, when using a comparable model specification and estimation 
technique. More specifically, US$1.00 of Danish aid increases Danish exports by around 
US$0.30 on average for all countries, in the long run (when using a GMM estimator that 
considers aid and exports as endogenous variables). The authors also use an alternative 
specification of the gravity model in which bilateral aid enters as the share of GDP in the 
recipient country as if it “inflates” the GDP coefficient. A theoretical justification of the 
introduction of aid as a transfer in the gravity model of trade has been recently developed by 
Kruse and Martinez-Zarzoso and (2016). The term added is ln (1+aid/GDP). In this 
specification, the return to aid of Danish exports is smaller than in the first one (around US$ 
0.08) and presents a lower variation across recipients. We will also use this alternative 
specification in this paper. 
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Among the studies that deviate from the gravity model framework, some have used 
Granger causality tests to investigate the direction of the causality. Lloyd, McGillivray, 
Morrissey, and Osei (2000) examined data on aid and trade flows for a sample of four 
European donors and 26 African recipients over the period from1969 to 1995. They found 
evidence showing that trade Granger-caused aid in 14% of the country pairs, aid Granger-
caused trade in 13% of the cases and bi-directional causality was found in 8% of the pairs. 
Along the same lines, Osei, Morrissey, and Lloyd (2004) extended the analysis to more 
countries and also found that donors providing a higher share of aid tend to trade more with 
the recipients. Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2016) ran Granger causality tests within a gravity 
model framework and found evidence for a bi-directional relationship between donor exports 
and bilateral aid, which implies that both series have to be considered as endogenous variables 
in the German case. Thus, they conclude that appropriate techniques should be used to 
address the endogeneity issue of all right-hand-side variables and suggest GMM methods and 
the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) approach (Wooldridge, 2009). 
A number of authors have evaluated the relationship between bilateral aid and bilateral 
exports with a special focus on the tying status of aid. According to two studies carried out in 
the 1990s (Arvin and Baum (1997) and Arvin and Choudhry (1997)), untied aid has roughly 
the same impact in terms of promoting donor exports
ii
 as tied aid due to recipient countries’ 
goodwill and/or parallel trade agreements and trade concessions on donor exports. Therefore, 
several authors have concluded that a formal tying of aid does not seem to provide additional 
benefits in terms of donor export levels (Jepma, 1991; Arvin and Baum, 1997; Arvin and 
Choudhry, 1997). However, Martínez-Zarzoso et al (2015) found that tying status is positively 
correlated to the effect of aid on donor exports over time (correlation = 0.75), with an even 
stronger correlation when the percentage of aid tied is higher than 30%; moreover, from 2000 
onwards, untying is associated with a decrease in the effect of aid on donor exports. 
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3. Augmented Gravity Model of Trade  
Recipient countries perceive aid as additional income that will eventually lead to an increase 
in demand in general, and of imports in particular, a phenomenon known as the income effect 
of aid. However, the income effect is smaller than it could potentially be because usually only 
part of the aid transfer is spent on domestic and foreign goods. There are several factors that 
contribute to reducing this income effect: First, a certain percentage of the aid received might 
never reach its destination due to corruption in the form of capital flight (Lambsdorff, 2002; 
Kasper, 2006). Second, a relatively large proportion of aid received might also be assigned to 
costs associated with administering and allocating the aid (Easterly and Williamson, 2011), 
while bad governance (Kaufmann, 2009) might lead to other inefficiencies (time delays, lost 
investment opportunities) in channelling aid to the beneficiaries. Third, some portion of the 
aid might never reach
iii
 the recipient country but instead may be spent in the donor country, 
for example, to pay technical assistance providers. A certain percentage of the aid might also 
be saved and therefore not spent on imports.  
In addition, there are other channels through which aid can directly influence imports from 
donor countries. For instance, there might be an export effect when a considerable share of 
donor aid is tied to imports from the donor country. There may also be habit-formation 
effects, whereby donor-funded exports for aid-related projects might make recipient countries 
more inclined to buy goods from the donor. Finally, the aid relationship promotes a trade 
relationship by creating “goodwill” towards donor exporters. Indeed, when donor countries 
combine aid missions and aid negotiations with trade missions, the aid relationship can “open 
the door” for donor exporters.  
In order to study the impact of foreign aid on exports, we focus on net Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and on two types of aid within this category: bilateral net 
ODA (aid) from the Netherlands (NDL) to a recipient country j (BAID); and the sum of 
bilateral aid given by all donors (except the Netherlands) to j (BAIDREST). There are two 
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main reasons that justify the use of these two aid categories. On the one hand, to the extent 
that aid improves recipient countries’ import capacity (through relieving bottlenecks, such as 
the savings- and the foreign exchange gap), we would expect both indicators of aid to boost 
overall exports from the Netherlands. On the other hand, BAID is also intended to measure 
the extent to which aid promotes bilateral relations between country pairs (the Netherlands 
and j); in this case, bilateral aid would promote not just overall exports but specifically 
exports from the Netherlands to recipient j. In addition, BAIDREST is added to investigate 
whether aid given by other donors influences an existing bilateral trade relationship between 
the Netherlands and j. While aid from other donors may lead to additional income that can be 
spent on imports from all j donors (especially if aid is untied), it might also promote imports 
from the other donors (see Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2015).  
We study the aid-export relationship within the framework of the gravity model, 
which has been developed and improved in the past three decades by Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1985, and 1989), Helpman (1987), Deardorff (1998), Feenstra et al. (2001), 
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, Feenstra (2004) and Haveman and Hummels (2004). Using 
the gravity model of trade we are able to evaluate and quantify the impact of aid on exports, 
controlling for a variety of factors related to trade frictions, the business cycle, level of 
development, etc. Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) (2003) contributed to this literature by 
modelling multilateral trade costs (the so-called multilateral resistance), and the AvW model 
has also been extended to applications explicitly involving developed and less developed 
countries by Nelson and Juhasz Silva (2012).  
The gravity model has been broadly used to investigate the role played by specific 
policy or geographical variables in explaining bilateral trade flows. Consistent with this 
approach, and in order to investigate the effect of development aid on Dutch exports, we 
include bilateral aid from the Netherlands as a “trade facilitator” factor, aid from other 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries as a “trade-deterrent” factor, and also 
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bilateral exchange rates
iv
. In our specific empirical application we focus exclusively on 
exports from the Netherlands over time to all its trading partners. We therefore specify a one-
side gravity model to explain bilateral exports, in which recipients are indexed by j, and years 
by t.  
 
3.1. Standard empirical specification 
The model for aggregate exports is given by, 
jtjtjtjt
jttjtjpjt
FTAEXRNBAIDREST
BAIDYNDLYRX




654
3210
lnln
lnlnlnln
     (1) 
where:  
ln denotes variables in natural logs; 
Xjt are exports from the Netherlands to country j in period t in current US$; 
YRjt indicates the recipient country j’s GDP in period t at current US$; 
YNDLt stands for Dutch GDP in period t in current US$;  
BAIDjt represents bilateral official net development aid (disbursement) from the Netherlands 
to country j in current US$;  
BAIDRESTjt represents other DAC donors’ (except the Netherlands) official net development 
aid disbursed to country j in current US$; 
EXRNjt represents the nominal bilateral exchange rate in monetary units of the recipient 
currency per Euro; 
FTAjt takes the value of 1 when the Netherlands has a free trade agreement in force with the 
destination country, j, in period t. 
We introduce period dummies ( p ) in model (1) to account for all sorts of time-varying 
changes during the period of 1964 to 2011. The period considered to generate the dummy 
variables is 3 years. Alternatively yearly time fixed effects t  could be included that control 
10 
 
for omitted variables common to all trade flows, but in this case, the coefficient of YNDL 
cannot be directly estimated and its effect is accounted for by the time dummies.  
j  are recipient-specific fixed effects that proxy for time-invariant recipient country 
characteristics or a time-invariant bonding between the Netherlands and the recipient country.  
When these effects are included, the influence of the dummies that vary only with the “j” 
dimension, such as distance, colonial ties or common language, cannot be directly estimated. 
Therefore, these variables are excluded from the regression equation, except for the system 
GMM approach. 
Equation (1) is estimated using different econometric approaches. First, in section 5 we apply 
panel data techniques, namely fixed effects and GMM estimations for two different time 
periods. GMM methods for dynamic panels have been proposed by Arellano and Bond (2001) 
and Blundell and Bond (2008) among others.  
 
3.2 Specification accounting for zero aid flows 
To account for the fact that a number of trade flows are zero, we follow Wagner (2003) and 
model bilateral aid using two variables. The first is specified as the maximum between one 
and bilateral aid and the second isn a dummy variable that takes the value of one when 
bilateral aid is not given and zero otherwise (NoBAID). We use this specification for both 
Dutch aid and aid from other donors (NoBAIDREST) to each recipient. The gravity 
specification is given by, 
  
 
jtjtjt
jtjtjt
jttjtjpjt
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

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 As bilateral aid (and other explanatory variables) might be endogenous (an increase in 
exports might increase the donor’s willingness to give more aid) and feed-back on each other, 
the endogeneity problem has to be tackled. We control for endogeneity in a panel setting by 
using the above mentioned GMM approach.   
Specification (2) is also estimated with time fixed effects.  From this specification the 
monetary return of bilateral aid in terms of bilateral exports can be computed as the estimated 
coefficient ( 3 ) multiplied by the corresponding bilateral exports as a share of bilateral aid. 
 
3.3 Specification disentangling the income and goodwill effects of aid 
An alternative specification, as proposed by Hansen and Rand (2014), is estimated in order to 
account for the fact that aid is a transfer and as such it increases the disposable income in the 
recipient country.  
This specification is more in line with the underlying trade theories and is based on the 
income generating effect of aid. We compute disposable gross national income (DGNI) by 
augmenting Gross National Income (GNI) with factor payments to foreigners and government 
transfers. Hence, disposable income (DGNI) equals, 
                                  
        =   
    
      
    
     (3) 
 
The proposed gravity specification is given by, 
 
jtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjt
FTAEXRN
GNIBAIDGNIX



 
43
210
ln
)/1ln()ln(ln
   (4) 
were GNI
+
jt…is the sum of GNI and BAIDREST. 
This specification has two advantages. First, it allows us to test whether bilateral aid only has 
an income generating effect (δ1=δ2) or instead, there is an additional “goodwill” effect 
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(δ2>δ1). Moreover, bilateral aid from other donors could have a positive effect on Dutch 
exports via the income effect or a negative trade diversion effect embodied in the term 
(BAID/GNI
+
). Second, specification (4) accounts for zero aid flows and does not require any 
“unnatural” transformation of the aid variables nor the use of  “noaid” dummy variables, as it 
is the case in specification (3). This could be considered as a very good reason for selecting 
model (4) to compute the monetary return to aid in terms of exports, as argued by Hansen and 
Rand (2014). 
Based on equation (4), the monetary return to bilateral aid in terms of exports is computed as, 
 
DGNI
X
δ
BAID
X
*=
∂
∂
2
         (5) 
 
It is clear from equation (5) that the amount of bilateral aid is not required to compute the 
dollar-to-dollar effect of aid on exports, hence using this specification, the monetary return 
could also be computed for “hypothetical” aid recipients that have not received aid in the past. 
 
4. Description of Data Sources and Data on Aid  
4.1 Data Sources 
Dutch Official Development Aid data are taken from the OECD Development Database on 
Aid from DAC Members for the period 1962 to 2011
v
. We consider net Dutch ODA 
disbursements in current US$ 
vi
 to specific recipient countries, instead of aid commitments, 
because we are interested in the funds actually released to the recipient countries in a given 
year. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or the 
transfer of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor.  
The donor countries that make up BAIDREST are Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New 
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Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. BAIDREST is thus computed as the sum of the above-mentioned net bilateral aid 
disbursements to each destination.  
Bilateral exports are obtained from UN COMTRADE
vii
. Data on income and 
population variables are drawn from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 
Database, 2012). Bilateral exchange rates are taken from IMF statistics, which have been 
corrected for the introduction of the euro and currency reforms in the recipient countries
viii
. 
Recipient country currency is in the numerator and donor country currency (1 EUR) stands in 
the denominator. Distances between capitals have been computed as great-circle distances 
using data on straight-line distances in kilometres, latitudes and longitudes, taken from the 
CEPII database
ix
. Trade impeding or promoting factors, such as being a former colony and 
sharing a common language or a common border, are also taken from the CEPII database and 
the FTA variable is from De Sousa (2012). Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the 
variables used in the regression analysis. 
 
 4.2 Net Bilateral Official Development Aid  
Aid given by DAC members is reported as official development aid (ODA) and other official 
flows (OOF). OOF accounts for other official transactions that do not meet ODA criteria
x
 and 
are therefore disregarded in our analysis. Both bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA, which 
are contributions to international agencies and organizations, are available but we consider 
only bilateral ODA as we want to capture what the Netherlands gives aid to a specific 
country.  Furthermore, we only studied aid disbursements and not commitments, as we were 
interested in what recipient countries actually receive in terms of aid. 
Net bilateral ODA disbursements, the aid data we will work with, are the sum of 
grants, capital subscriptions, net loans, and other long-term capital provided by the Dutch 
government (BAID) and the other donors’ governments (BAIDREST). Grants include debt 
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forgiveness and interest subsidies in associated financing packages. Loans and other long-
term capital include disbursements of ODA loans and equity investment. Net loans and other 
long-term capital represent the loans extended minus repayment received and offsetting 
entries for debt relief. Technical cooperation, development food aid and emergency aid are 
included in grants and loans. 
 
5. Estimation Techniques and Results 
5.1 Estimation and results for total exports applying panel fixed-effects and GMM 
In order to model dynamics and to account for persistence in trade relations and trade flows, 
we introduce the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. The dynamic 
specification is given by 
jttjjtjtjt
jttjtjpjt
XFTAEXRNBAIDREST
BAIDYNDLYRX




1,654
3210
lnlnln
lnlnlnln
   (5)    
where most of the variables are as described above and Xj,t-1 represents exports from the 
Netherlands to country j in period t-1 in current US$.  
The main problems of this specification are related to the statistical difficulties caused 
by the combination of an endogenous regressor (lagged exports) and autocorrelated errors. As 
a result, the OLS estimates become biased and inconsistent (the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is biased towards unity, whereas the remaining coefficients are biased 
towards zero). A panel data estimator based on the within transformation will eliminate the 
bilateral unobserved heterogeneity, mitigating the endogeneity problem, but still the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable could be slightly biased, even for a moderate to 
large time dimension in the dataset. These difficulties can be overcome using panel GMM 
estimation techniques that control for endogeneity of the explanatory variables and for 
autocorrelated errors. More specifically, to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity ( j ), we 
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take first differences of the variables used in the model, and to control for endogeneity we use 
lagged levels of the endogenous variables (lagged exports and lagged aid) as instruments. The 
model in first differences produces, 
jtjtjtjt
jttjttjjt
FTAEXRNBAIDREST
BAIDYNDLYRXtX



 
654
3211,
lnln
lnlnlnlnln
(6) 
In addition we also tested the use of the system GMM
1
 estimator proposed by Blundell 
and Bond (1998), which basically adds orthogonality conditions (instrumental variables) to 
the difference-GMM method. In particular, lagged levels of the endogenous variables are used 
as instruments for the equation in first differences, whereas lagged differences are used as 
instruments for the equation in levels. In the system GMM specification time-invariant 
variables can also be added as regressors; thus the natural log of distance and the dummies 
common colony and landlocked status are considered. The first dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if there was ever a colonial relationship between countries i and j, and zero 
otherwise. Landlocked status takes the value of 1 when a recipient country is landlocked, and 
zero otherwise. 
According to the specified models, we assume that the relationship between Dutch aid 
and Dutch exports is linear. A scatter plot between both variables (available on request) shows 
this to be a reasonable assumption, as does the small magnitude of the aid figures in 
comparison to the export figures. Specification tests also rejected the inclusion of a quadratic 
aid-term in the estimated equation. 
As discussed above, there might be an endogeneity issue, referring to aid being 
‘caused’ by exports, rather than the reverse. We address this issue through panel GMM 
applied to the alternative specifications that consider zero aid flows (equation 2 above) and 
the separate income generating effect of aid (equation 4). 
                                                          
1
 Only in some cases sys-GMM passed the specification test, alternatively diff-GMM was used. 
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Table 2 shows the results for the dynamic models, as given by equations (5) and (6). 
Columns (1) to (3) show the results obtained with country and time fixed effects and columns 
(4) to (6) those obtained with System GMM.  
The first column in Table 2 shows the results for the dynamic fixed effect model for 
the whole period whereas columns 2 and 3 show the results obtained for the periods 1964-
1999 and 2000-2011. The second part of the table shows the respective outcomes for System 
GMM.  
 The impact of bilateral aid lies in a range of 0.016 and 0.025 in the short run. Given 
the persistence of the export series, it is more appropriate to rely on the dynamic models and 
to fully account for the possible endogeneity of bilateral aid using the system GMM results 
(column 4-6), which satisfy the Hansen test of instrument validity and also show no second 
order autocorrelation. The short-run aid coefficient equals 0.029 and it is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, whereas the long-run elasticity is 0.044, calculated as 
(0.029/(1-0.326)).  
As regards the rest of the explanatory variables, the income variables show the 
expected positive coefficient and the magnitude is close to the theoretical value of one (0.50) 
for the coefficient of the recipient income, whereas the coefficient of the Dutch income is 0.02 
in column 4). The coefficient of lagged exports is statistically significant showing the 
relevance of dynamics in the model, with a coefficient that indicates persistence over time. 
Aid given by other donors is negative and significant in the dynamic specification in the 
overall and in the first period (1964-1999) which drives the results, whereas the exchange rate 
variable is not statistically significant in any of the specifications.  
With the system GMM method we are able to estimate the effect of the time-invariant 
variables, namely geographical distance, landlocked status and colonial relationship. We 
obtain the expected negative effects for the two first variables, whereas colonial links show a 
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significant positive effect on Dutch exports. These results are significant and the 1% level and 
hold for all periods.   
Using the results of system GMM (Table 2, col. (4)), and the corresponding long-run 
elasticity, we see that aid has a positive and significant impact on Dutch exports. The average 
return on aid for Dutch exports is approximately a US$0.40 increase in exports for each dollar 
spent
xi
. This implies that in the long term and over the whole period, the monetary return on 
Dutch aid in terms of exports is less than proportional. The return to aid in the period 1964-
1999 amounts to US$ 0.38 per one dollar of aid. The impact of Dutch aid on Dutch exports is 
non-significant in the second period (2000-2011) as it was the objective of Dutch aid policy to 
reduce the number of recipient countries from thirty-three to fifteen countries. This implies 
that only 15 out of 119 countries in the sample continued to receive substantial amounts of 
aid. 
However, in the results in Table 2 zero aid flows are not taken into account in the estimations. 
Table 3 presents the results obtained when we estimated the model based on equation (2) 
controlling for zero aid flows. The fixed-effects estimation shows that bilateral aid has also a 
positive and significant impact in the range of 0.010 and 0.014 in the short run (col. 1 and 2). 
The impact of bilateral aid in the long run is slightly larger and in a range of 0.028 and 0.036. 
This implies that a 10% increase in bilateral aid increases Dutch exports by 0.30 to 0.36%. 
Bilateral aid of the other donors mainly has a non-statistically significant impact on Dutch 
exports. Aid has a non-significant impact on Dutch exports in the second period (2000-2011). 
These results are confirmed by the Diff-GMM estimations. Aid (considering zero aid flows) 
has a positive and significant impact in the first period (1964-1999) and an insignificant 
impact in the second period (2000-2011). The return to aid for the whole period is US$ 0.36 
and US$ 0.26 for the first period (1964-1999). 
 Next, as an alternative that also takes zero aid flows into account, the model based on 
equation (4) is estimated. It has also the advantage of identifying the income-generating and 
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the goodwill-generating effect of bilateral aid separately. Results are shown in Table 4. We 
obtain quite plausible coefficients for the income-generating effect, with a magnitude around 
0.27 in the short run (column 1) and a magnitude of 0.72 in the long-run. We also find also 
positive and significant goodwill-generating effects. When the model is estimated using Diff-
GMM, the income-generating effect is 0.50 in the short run and 0.65 in the long run. The 
goodwill generating effect of bilateral aid shows an estimated coefficient of 6.5, which 
implies that a 1% increase in the ratio of bilateral aid to GNI
+
 increases Dutch exports by 
6.5% in the short-run and by 9.2% in the long run. The monetary return to aid of exports is 
around 0.3 US$ for each 1$ of exports and remains stable with the FE and the GMM 
specification. Moreover, both estimation approaches indicate that the goodwill effect was 
mainly present in the first period when the Dutch ministry for International Development 
disbursed aid to a multitude of countries. In the second period when the number of recipient 
countries was limited first to some 33 countries and later on to 15 countries the goodwill 
effect of aid disappeared.  
All in all the results obtained by either System-GMM or Diff-GMM should be given priority 
as they take reverse causality of aid into account and also control for endogeneity of the other 
control variables. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study evaluates the link between bilateral exports and foreign aid for an individual donor, 
the Netherlands, to investigate whether bilateral aid implies, as a side effect, increased Dutch 
exports to the recipient countries. This increase could be explained by a positive income effect 
in the recipient country and/or by a reduction in trade costs associated with the flow of aid. 
The empirical estimations are based on an augmented gravity model of trade in which foreign 
aid is specified in two flavours. In the first, foreign aid is captured as a part of the trade costs 
component, as has usually been done in the gravity literature. In the second method foreign 
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aid is captured as a transfer that essentially inflates income in the recipient country. The 
second specification has several advantages, it permit us to separate the pure income effect 
from the trade cost reducing effect or “goodwill effect” of aid, it also accounts for the 
heterogeneous effects across recipients and avoids the problem of zero aid flows attached to 
the estimation of a log-linear model.  
Employing advanced panel data techniques, which account for the dynamics of the 
relationship and the potential problems of reverse causality, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between Dutch aid and Dutch exports over the 1964-2011 period. The results are 
mainly driven by the 1964-1998 period, in which the Netherlands disbursed aid to a larger 
number of countries. The positive and significant aid coefficient is robust to a number of 
variations in the specification (controlling for zero aid flows, separating the income effect of 
aid from the goodwill effect) and estimation techniques (use of country-fixed and time-fixed 
effects, controlling for endogeneity via GMM). We observe that when Dutch aid policy began 
to strictly target aid to very few countries and to a few sectors (water, health, food security) in 
the later period (1999-2011), the good-will effect of aid on Dutch exports disappeared.  
With respect to the two competing specifications, we find that modelling aid as a transfer 
provides a lower average monetary return to aid in terms of exports, which is around 0.02-0.3 
US$ for each 1$ of exports that remains stable across specifications (dynamic FE and diff-
GMM). However, when aid is modelled as a part of trade costs, the monetary return varies 
across specifications and is considerably higher in magnitude (0.26-0.53 US$ for each 1US$ 
of aid). We find that the economic effects are remarkably small, which is not surprising, given 
that the Dutch importers that are also recipients of Dutch aid, are in general poor and far away 
from the Netherlands. In any case, it is worth mentioning that the overall average effect hides 
a wide variation across recipients, which mainly depends on the ratio of aid with respect to the 
recipient GDP. Putting the results into perspective and comparing the impact of Dutch aid 
with the impact of aid from other donor countries (e.g. Germany (Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 
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2016) or Denmark (Hansen and Rand (2016)), we find Dutch bilateral aid to be only slightly 
export-promoting in the 1964-2011 period, quite far from the German estimate of 1.4 US$ 
and closer to the Danish estimate of 0.30 US$. This is probably due to several distinctive 
differences when comparing the Dutch and the German aid system and their economies. In 
regards to the aid system, only about one-third of Dutch aid is given bilaterally, while in the 
German case, two-thirds is bilateral aid; as we only consider the effect of bilateral aid, this 
reduces the impact.
xii
  
Going forward, future research should focus on a more comprehensive comparison of the 
differences in export elasticities with respect to aid between EU countries, using the “transfer” 
motivated specification while also examining sectoral export effects. A second aspect that is 
outside the scope of this paper will be to investigate the heterogeneity of the elasticities across 
developing countries and across productive sectors. 
 
  
21 
 
 
                                                          
i
 It is now standard to use fixed effects estimations to control for recipient country heterogeneity. Therefore, 
average returns of aid slightly below EUR 1.00 can be considered reasonable estimates. 
ii
 On the recipient side, tying noticeably reduces the benefit of aid (Jepma, 1991; Wagner, 2003; World Bank, 
1998), and for this reason in 2001, the OECD-DAC recommended a progressive reduction of tying practices. 
iii
 The official definition of aid from the OECD (DAC) includes not only money spent by the donor on refugees 
from developing countries, political asylum seekers or students from developing countries studying in the donor 
country, but also the salaries of donor country consultants, research on developing countries in the donor country 
and so on. 
iv
 When the gravity model is estimated using panel data (with a time dimension), exchange rates are generally 
included as determinants of bilateral trade flows over time. 
v
 The original sample with data for the period 1962-2011 had to be reduced as the early years (1962-1963) were 
characterized by an inconsistent Dutch development agenda. See the Appendix for a list of countries (Tables A.1 
and A.2).  
vi
 This amount comprises total grants and concessional loans granted (according to DAC criteria for concessional 
loans). 
vii
 Online database: http://comtrade.un.org/db/. 
viii
 The IFS and WDI statistics are not adjusted for currency reforms and therefore very problematic. We 
corrected the data accordingly. 
ix
 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/fdi.html. 
x
 For example, grants to aid recipients for representational or essentially commercial purposes, official bilateral 
transactions intended to promote development but with a grant element of less than 25% or official bilateral 
transactions, regardless of the grant element, that primarily serve an export-facilitating purpose ("official direct 
export credits").  Net acquisitions by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by 
multilateral development banks at market terms, subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to aid 
recipients and funds in support of private investment are also classified as OOF. 
 
xi This average is calculated as: 
39.0=
13.12
99.101
*047.0=*=
∂
∂
⇒*
∂
∂
=
BAID
X
β
BAID
X
X
BAID
BAID
X
β BAIDGLBAID   
 
xii
 Including multilateral aid is difficult as one cannot easily ascribe it to its bilateral contributors.   
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Tables  
Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Variable notation and description Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
X = Total Dutch Exports
a 
5,147 151.5118 518.9134 0.0008 
9445.18
1 
BAID = Dutch ODA
a 
4,935 8.095 20.746 -315.790 344.030 
ln X = ln Dutch Exports 
5,147 16.778 2.286 6.712 22.969 
ln BAID = ln Dutch ODA 
3,545 14.330 2.378 9.210 19.656 
ln BAIDREST = ln ODA rest of 
DAC  
4,554 17.754 1.920 9.210 23.808 
ln YNDL = ln Dutch GDP  
5,147 26.136 1.040 23.489 27.493 
ln YR =  ln Recipient GDP 
5,147 22.378 2.124 
16.1987
6 29.411 
ln EXRN = ln Exchange rate 
5,147 1.557 4.667 -29.693 10.137 
FTA = Regional Trade Agreement 
Dummy 
5,147 0.057 0.231 0 1 
Ln Distance 5,139 8.721 0.573 5.763 9.715 
Colony Dummy 5,139 0.029 0.168 0 1 
Landlocked Dummy 
5,139 0.165 0.371 0 1 
Note: Sample of 142 countries, listed in Table A.2. 
a
 Million US Dollars at current prices. ODA denotes Official 
Development Aid. DAC denotes Development Assistance Committee. 
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Table 2. Dynamic Gravity Model 
  
CTFE
a
 
 
System-GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1964-2011 1964-1999 2000-2011 1964-2011 1964-1999 2000-2011 
              
 ln Dutch ODA 0.0164** 0.0248** 0.0115 0.0299** 0.0427** 0.0264 
 
[0.00758] [0.0111] [0.0119] [0.0147] [0.0210] [0.0199] 
ln ODA rest of 
DAC 0.0195 0.0261* 0.0448** -0.0401** -0.0447** -0.0273 
 
[0.0141] [0.0157] [0.0213] [0.0197] [0.0225] [0.0290] 
ln Dutch Exports 
(lagged) 0.538*** 0.477*** 0.405*** 0.326*** 0.317*** 0.508*** 
 
[0.0279] [0.0305] [0.0562] [0.0743] [0.0864] [0.0647] 
 ln Dutch GDP 0.180*** 0.169*** 0.707*** 0.0157 0.00326 0.284 
 
[0.0560] [0.0645] [0.159] [0.0611] [0.0689] [0.227] 
 ln Recipient GDP 0.379*** 0.425*** 0.259*** 0.497*** 0.490*** 0.366*** 
 
[0.0376] [0.0415] [0.0873] [0.0676] [0.0755] [0.0582] 
 ln Exchange rate -0.00505 -0.00855 -0.0819 0.00180 0.00420 -0.00433 
 
[0.00569] [0.00527] [0.0836] [0.00781] [0.00891] [0.0147] 
 Ln Distance 
   
-0.821*** -0.827*** -0.513*** 
    
[0.131] [0.158] [0.135] 
Colony Dummy 
   
1.067*** 1.063*** 0.572** 
    
[0.264] [0.277] [0.249] 
Landlocked Dummy 
   
-0.587*** -0.624*** -0.359*** 
    
[0.132] [0.166] [0.112] 
Regional Trade 
Agreement Dummy 0.111** 0.0254 0.0696 0.0119 -0.123 0.0585 
 
[0.0494] [0.0315] [0.0678] [0.0933] [0.0869] [0.0867] 
Long-run effect of 
Dutch ODA 0.0355** 0.0474** - 0.0444** 0.0625** - 
$  return of Dutch 
ODA in the long run 0.32 0.29 - 0.40 0.38 - 
Period dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,449 2,488 961 3,449 2,488 961 
R-squared 0.804 0.713 0.737   
  N of recipients 130 127 119 130 127 119 
N of Instruments 
   
122 96 121 
AR1 test prob. 
   
0.000 0.006 6.81e-06 
AR2 test prob. 
   
0.118 0.130 0.852 
Hansen Test prob.       0.421 0.211 0.391 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a
CTFE: estimations based on country- 
and time fixed effects. Period dummies (every 3 years) are included in all specifications. The list of 130 
recipients can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. ODA denotes Official Development Aid. DAC denotes 
Development Assistance Committee. 
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Table 3. The Impact of Dutch Bilateral Aid on Dutch Exports Including Zero Aid Flows  
  
CTFE
a
 
  
Diff-GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 1964-2011 1964-1999 2000-2011 1964-2011 1964-1999 2000-2011 
              
ln Dutch ODA 
(max) 0.0104** 0.0140** 0.00316 0.0130 0.0208* -0.00487 
 
[0.00429] [0.00682] [0.00480] [0.0104] [0.0138] [0.00543] 
ln ODA rest of 
DAC (max) 0.00273 0.00119 0.00643 0.00323 0.00112 0.00988* 
 
[0.00256] [0.00339] [0.00430] [0.00307] [0.00255] [0.00571] 
ln Dutch 
Exports (lagged) 0.635*** 0.608*** 0.354*** 0.322*** 0.279*** 0.130* 
 
[0.0456] [0.0586] [0.0639] [0.0554] [0.0832] [0.0717] 
ln Recipient 
GDP 0.274*** 0.305*** 0.335*** 0.415*** 0.401*** 0.553*** 
 
[0.0553] [0.0567] [0.103] [0.0786] [0.0782] [0.112] 
 ln Dutch GDP 0.0874** 0.0902 0.622*** 0.308*** 0.273*** 0.464** 
 
[0.0437] [0.0583] [0.212] [0.0940] [0.0907] [0.214] 
ln Exchange 
Rate -0.00512 -0.00712 -0.0677 0.0190 0.0136 0.0162 
 
[0.00474] [0.00444] [0.0972] [0.0322] [0.0265] [0.0889] 
Regional Trade 
Agreement 
Dummy  0.0997** 0.183** 0.0147 0.117* -0.0368 0.0693 
 
[0.0428] [0.0760] [0.0712] [0.0645] [0.119] [0.0700] 
No Dutch ODA 
Dummy 0.0563 0.0546 0.00724 0.235* 0.394** -0.0681 
 
[0.0476] [0.0685] [0.0777] [0.122] [0.156] [0.0887] 
No ODA rest of 
DAC Dummy 0.00616 -0.153 0.0284 -0.0650 -0.174 0.0887 
 
[0.0750] [0.144] [0.0812] [0.137] [0.139] [0.157] 
Long-run effect 
of  ln Dutch 
ODA (max) 0.0285** 0.0357** - - 0.0288* - 
$ Return  in the 
long run 0.53 0.32 - 0.36 0.26 - 
Period dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,147 3,602 1,545 4,987 3,456 1,531 
R-squared 0.823 0.756 0.610   
  N  of recipients 142 139 142 142 139 142 
N of  
instruments 
   
165 128 165 
AR1 test prob. 
   
0.000 0.000 0.000994 
AR2 test prob. 
   
0.0431 0.0500 0.362 
Hansen Test 
prob.       0.615 0.273 0.857 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a
CTFE: estimation based on country- 
and time fixed effects. The list of 142 recipients can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ODA denotes 
Official Development Aid. DAC denotes Development Assistance Committee. 
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Table 4. The Impact of Dutch Bilateral Aid on Dutch Exports. Theoretically Based 
Specification Accounting for the Income Effect and the Goodwill Effects of Aid 
  
CTFE
a
 
  
Diff-GMM 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
1964-
2011 1964-1999 2000-2011 1964-2011 1964-1999 2000-2011 
              
ln Dutch ODA 
(goodwill aid 
effect) 3.411** 3.046** 6.194 6.492** 5.516*** -2.618 
 
[1.565] [1.320] [5.796] [2.877] [2.002] [6.176] 
ln Dutch ODA 
(income effect) 0.267*** 0.275*** 0.361*** 0.496*** 0.502*** 0.467*** 
 
[0.0679] [0.0727] [0.0996] [0.0962] [0.107] [0.109] 
ln Dutch Exports 
(lagged) 0.631*** 0.610*** 0.349*** 0.226*** 0.156** 0.0573 
 
[0.0518] [0.0675] [0.0636] [0.0591] [0.0730] [0.0780] 
ln Dutch GDP  0.119*** 0.143*** 0.602*** 0.216** 0.177** 0.735*** 
 
[0.0422] [0.0509] [0.203] [0.0839] [0.0891] [0.221] 
ln Exchange 
Rate -0.00425 -0.00660 -0.0521 0.0251 0.0327 -0.142 
 
[0.00448] [0.00405] [0.0939] [0.0280] [0.0264] [0.0908] 
Regional Trade 
Agreement 
Dummy 0.0861** 0.159** 0.0227 0.0391 0.0446 0.0819 
 
[0.0434] [0.0709] [0.0692] [0.0482] [0.0532] [0.0526] 
Long-run effect 
of  Dutch 
ODA(goodwill 
effect) 9.243** 7.810** - 8.387** 6.535*** - 
$ Return  in the 
long-run
b
 0.03 0.02 - 0.03 0.02 - 
Period dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 4,919 3,388 1,531 4,764 3,246 1,518 
R-squared 0.823 0.757 0.606 
   N  of recipients 142 134 142 142 134 142 
N of Instruments 
   
115 89 115 
AR1 test prob. 
   
0.000 0.000 0.0026 
AR2 test prob. 
   
0.241 0.322 0.252 
Hansen Test 
prob.       0.142 0.254 0.197 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a
CTFE: estimations based on country- 
and time fixed effects.
 b
The $ return shows the goodwill effect related to Dutch ODA in the recipient countries. 
The list of 142 recipients can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. ODA denotes Official Development Aid. 
 
 
